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Abstract 
I examine the relationship between IPO underpricing and media exposure, using a sample of 
54 IPOs launched on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period of 2003-2006. I use the A-tekst 
database to measure media exposure, using four observation periods relative to the IPO. The 
findings show that there is a negative relationship between underpricing and media coverage 
in the IPO subscription period. Furthermore, I show that underpricing increases publicity in 
the time after the listing. However, the study fails to find any significant relationship 
between underpricing and media coverage in the week prior to going public.  
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1. Introduction 
Media and financial markets are closely interconnected. The financial news provides updates 
on relevant events that may affect market movements. On the other hand, market players 
contribute to the media image by disclosing and revealing information and giving their 
analyses, opinions and recommendations. Media is an arena where market actors can 
coordinate their views and distribute information. 
This thesis looks at the role of media exposure when firms go public, and how this relates to 
the usual discount that is given in connection with an Initial Public Offering (IPO), referred 
to as underpricing. An IPO is defined here as the act of raising capital in connection with 
becoming a listed company on a public stock exchange.   
On average, shares sold through an IPO experience an abnormal first day return on the 
public stock exchange. This is regarded as a significant opportunity cost for the issuing firm, 
since this could have been avoided by more conservative pricing. The phenomenon of 
underpricing is well documented worldwide (Ritter, 2003). Various theories have searched 
to explain why firms leave money on the table. Rock (1986), one of the most quoted in this 
respect, explains underpricing as a means of reducing the adverse selection problem among 
investors. In his model, informed investors have superior information that they can take 
advantage of by only subscribing to offerings that are sold below their mean value. The 
uninformed investor, on the other hand, is not able to distinguish between an overpriced 
(which the informed investor would avoid) and an underpriced offering. She will therefore 
fear a winner’s curse. In order to assure a sufficient demand, Rock (1986) argues that the 
offering must gain the uninformed investor’s trust by giving a discount. 
Among other theories which build on asymmetric information we may also find that 
underpricing is explained as a reward to informed investors for revealing their information 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), as an act to signal the firm’s quality (e.g. Welch, 1989) and 
as a result of conflicting interests between the issuer and its underwriters (e.g. Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002).  
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As one can understand, information plays a major role in understanding the concept of 
underpricing. One should therefore assume that effective communication would be crucial to 
the issuer and its intermediates in order to reduce the asymmetric information problem. In 
this manner, promotion through the media is stressed in the literature describing the IPO 
process. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist write that, “Other important forms of marketing can 
include press briefings, which can be especially important when the involvement of retail 
investors is desired (…)” (2001:15).  
From this quote, we may understand that media exposure is effective in the sense of having a 
wide range. Media enables communication to a broad range of investors in order to make 
them aware of the offering and to educate uninformed investors. A distinction is usually 
drawn between retail and institutional investors, where the latter group is normally regarded 
as informed. In the early marketing process, the issuer and its underwriters mainly 
communicate face-to-face with institutional investors in road shows. Retail investors 
however, are not included at this stage, and to reach out to them, one would therefore need 
broader promotion, as the quote reflects.   
However, it would be a serious mistake to assume that the media is a one-way marketing 
tool where the issuer has a monopoly on information. This is far from true. In the media, we 
may also observe analysts and similar experts evaluating the offer on various grounds and 
potential investors giving their opinions and revealing complimentary information in order to 
have an impact on the market. The media therefore contains public, private and even noisy 
information.  
Prior studies on media exposure and underpricing have reported that increased media 
attention is significantly related to the initial return. Liu, Sherman and Zhang (2006) report 
that media exposure is followed by increased underpricing, which they suggest is due to 
institutional investors stimulating the aftermarket in order to secure a quick return. 
According to their proposal, investors expect to gain this return as a reward for revealing 
their private information in the bookbuilding process.  
DuCharme and Rajgopal (2001), however, argue that the excessive underpricing, which was 
experienced during the internet bubble in the late 90s and beginning of the new millennium, 
could be explained by media hype which seduced investors in the aftermarket. 
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A third approach, on the other hand, looks at how underpricing induces media awareness. 
Demers and Lewellen (2003) argue that part of the IPO discount is motivated by increased 
publicity and marketing benefits. This is based on the observation that increased 
underpricing is followed by publicity in the media. They therefore suggest that part of 
underpricing should be regarded as a deliberate strategy to raise awareness of the company 
and its products or services.   
In this thesis, I examine whether ex ante media exposure is related to underpricing, and the 
other way around - if underpricing affects publicity ex post. I search to investigate three 
main questions: 1) Does media coverage in the immediate time prior to going public affect 
the demand in the aftermarket, and thereby induce an extensive return, 2) Does media 
coverage in the subscription period reflect the information gap and thereby the IPO pricing, 
and 3) Is underpricing related to publicity after becoming listed. I explain these questions in 
more detail in the methodology chapter. 
Endeavours to answer these questions are based on a quantitative empirical study built on a 
sample of 54 IPOs on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2006. In order to measure 
media exposure I make use of the A-tekst database maintained by Norway’s largest and most 
significant newspapers. Furthermore, I use different observation periods relative to the IPO, 
in order to answer the proposed questions.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In section 2, I give a brief literature review of the 
theoretical literature that I find relevant to the scope. Furthermore, in section 3 the empirical 
design is developed. Section 4 describes the data sample, before presenting descriptive data 
in section 5. Thereafter follows a multiple regression analysis and discussion of results 
(section 6), before the presentation is closed with a discussion on the robustness of the 
findings (section 7) and a conclusion (section 8). 
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2. Literature review 
Since Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) documented the phenomenon of underpricing, it has been 
one of the greatest puzzles in the literature of finance. No single theory is, however, yet able 
to give an exhaustive explanation, whereby many various approaches contribute to explain 
frequent complimentary areas. The theoretical approaches therefore range widely with the 
major approaches concentrating on asymmetric information, institutional concerns and 
ownership control as the suggested explanations (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). On the 
other hand, this review focuses on theories that are relevant to the relationship between 
media coverage and underpricing. It is therefore far from exhaustive.  
 
2.1 Theories on underpricing 
Since media obviously contain information, asymmetric information theories are central to 
the following analysis. Asymmetric information theories build on the assumption that some 
players are better informed than others are. Investors or issuers have private information, not 
publicly known, which creates uncertainty in the market.  
 
Winner’s curse 
Rock’s (1986), winner’s curse model is one of the earliest models that formally and 
rationally explains underpricing. An important feature of this model, and how it differs from 
competing models, is that it assumes that the issuer is not able to discriminate between 
uninformed and informed investors. Shares are thereby, allocated randomly among investors. 
By a winner’s curse, we therefore mean the uninformed investors’ fear of being allocated a 
relatively larger portion of overpriced offerings (because the informed will not subscribe to 
them) than of underpriced ones (because they will then have to compete with the informed 
investors in the allocation). Without underpricing, the uninformed investors would, on 
average, experience a negative return.  
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Therefore, to assure that the offering is successfully completed, shares are sold significantly 
below their real value to attract the marginal uninformed investor. According to Rock 
(1986), underpricing should be regarded as a rational action taken by the issuers to reduce 
the issuer’s risk of having to withdraw the offering.  
 
Information revelation theory 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), on the other hand, assume that the issuer is able to identify 
and favour informed investors, whereby the marginal investor is assumed to be informed. In 
this light, they argue that underpricing should be regarded as a reward to investors for 
revealing their private information. Informed investors are assumed to have superior 
information relative to the issuers, and issuers use underpricing as a means to induce it.  
An important feature of this model is that it takes a bookbuilding approach. When using such 
an IPO method, one will typically set an indicative price range before deciding on a final 
subscription price. In the bookbuilding period, investors are asked to sign their unbinding 
interest to the offering. This is intended to give the issuer an estimate of the expected 
demand when the final offering price is set and the offering is carried out. Rock (1986), on 
the other hand, builds his model on fixed price offerings. When such a method is used, the 
prospectus will contain a single offer price, which is regarded as a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposal (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). 
According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), investors would have an incentive to reveal their 
correct interest if they are rewarded with underpricing combined with being allocated a 
larger share of the offering. Issuers should therefore design the process so that investors that 
show an interest in the upper half of the indicative price range are rewarded with a larger 
portion of the offered shares. 
 
Partial adjustment 
Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model assumes that the offering price is only partially 
adjusted to the new information about increased demand. Hanley (1993) tested this 
assumption empirically, and showed that when offering prices were revised upwards relative 
to their indicated levels, underpricing tended to increase significantly. However, there are 
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several views other than Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model that attempt to explain the 
phenomenon of partial adjustment.  
 
Prospect theory 
Developing one of these views, Loughran and Ritter (2002), argue that partial adjustment 
can be predicted by public information. They argue that underwriters take advantage of 
underpricing in self-interest by rewarding their most favored investors. This is in 
contradiction with Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) proposal, which says that underpricing is  
driven by the revelation of private information. The puzzle is therefore to answer why 
issuers accept that underwriters leave money on the table in their own interests, in spite of 
the publicly available information. To answer this, they make use of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. They argue that issuers are more excited about the relative 
increase in their wealth, experienced by an upwards price revision, than being upset about 
underpricing.  
 
Substitute theory 
Ljungqvist and Habib (2001), on the other hand, argue that underpricing is used as a 
substitute for marketing expenditures. Because promotion reduces the adverse selection 
problem, it should also reduce underpricing. Issuers therefore face a trade-off between 
underpricing and marketing expenditures. Their article empirically shows that every dollar 
spent on promotional activities, such as road shows, prospectus, underwriter reputation, 
auditing etc. decreases underpricing by one dollar on the margin.  
 
Sentiment investor theory  
Recently however, there has been a growing concern that the financial markets do not 
necessarily act rationally all the time. This concern is also present in the literature on 
underpricing where sentiment investor theories in particular, frequently explain how 
irrationality may affect underpricing.  
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Sentiment investor theories assume that some investors have biased estimates of a 
company’s value, based on noisy information in the market. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 
(2003) developed a model that distinguishes unbiased and sentiment (biased) investors. 
Sentiment investors can be either too optimistic or too pessimistic regarding company 
valuation. However, because short trading is not possible in the pre-market, pessimistic 
investors do not participate.  
This theory does not assume asymmetric information. Instead, the rational and irrational 
investors agree to disagree on their estimates. Institutional investors are assumed to have 
unbiased estimates. Underpricing is explained in that issuers sell IPO shares to informed 
investors, who gain positive returns by selling to retail investors with biased estimates in the 
longer-term aftermarket.. However, because demand could possibly decrease in the future, 
issuers have to compensate this risk by underpricing the shares.   
 
2.2 Underpricing and media exposure  
The studies focusing on the particular field of media and underpricing build on asymmetric 
theories, behavioural (sentiment) theories and marketing benefits to explain how media and 
underpricing are related. The main proposals from the literature may be summarized as 
follows: 
• Media coverage in the subscription period reflects information that is used in pricing 
the offering and connected to the adverse selection problem.  
• Media hype prior to going public fuels the demand in the aftermarket. 
• Underpricing is deliberately used to increase ex post publicity as a substitute for 
product marketing expenditures.  
 
2.2.1 Adverse selection and media exposure 
Liu, Sherman and Zhang (2006) find an asymmetrical positive relationship between 
underpricing and ex ante media exposure. They suggest that underpricing is increased by 
positive news, as informed investors use the media to publish positive information. 
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According to their proposal, informed investors have no reason to withhold their private 
information from the public after revealing it to the underwriters. Rather, they have an 
incentive to create a sufficient demand in the aftermarket, in case they want to secure a quick 
return. 
They interpret their empirical findings as evidence to Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model, 
which says that investors are rewarded for revealing positive private information. However, 
one should be aware that their definition of positive and negative news does not say anything 
about the news content. Positive news is defined as media exposure on offerings that make 
an upward price revision, regardless of what the news actually reports. Likewise, negative 
news is defined as equal to the media exposure on offerings that make a downward price 
revision. A strict interpretation of their findings would therefore suggest there is a positive 
relationship between underpricing and media coverage only for offerings that make an 
upward price revision. 
  
2.2.2 Media hype and underpricing 
As argued, media coverage also contains noisy information, which may have an irrational 
impact on market movements. In particular, the media is accused of fuelling irrational 
optimism among investors in bull markets, by giving disproportional attention to certain 
stocks. Clark, Thrift and Tickell (2004) argue that the media drives stock prices upwards in 
good times, while it acts more as a bystander in bad times.  
The period of the so-called dotcom bubble in the late 90s and the beginning of the new 
millennium is often characterized as a time of extreme optimism, which some claim was 
partly fuelled by media hype. DuCharme and Rajgopal (2001) show that extensive media 
exposure in the week prior to going public is significantly related to the initial return. They, 
furthermore, argue that high growth companies in the so-called “new economy” made use of 
such hype to boost the demand in the aftermarket in order to increase underpricing. In this 
way, they attempted to leave a good taste in the mouths of pre-market investors, and as a 
result, received favourable terms when quickly returning to the capital markets. This 
argument is based on companies with a high cash burn being particularly underpriced, which 
gives sense to why issuers accepted leaving money on the table.  
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However, a later study on a sample from the London Stock Exchange conducted by 
Staikouras and Tsatsanis (2004) reports that the final week’s media coverage is negatively 
related to underpricing. The comparative advantage of their study is that it consists of 
companies from a wide range of industries, and over a longer period. They argue that a 
negative relationship could imply a shift in investor psychology, since a negative 
relationship reflects that investors are well informed on companies surrounded by high 
media coverage. However, they also suggest an alternative explanation which is built on 
behavioural arguments, which I will not go further into depth.  
 
2.2.3 Underpricing, media exposure and marketing benefits 
It has also been argued that underpricing could be used as a means of gaining marketing 
benefits. The interplay between product markets and financial markets has been subject to  
growing interest in recent years (Demers and Lewellen, 2003). So has the relationship 
between IPOs and marketing benefits, and how underpricing impacts on this. The marketing 
benefits are used as a complementary argument as to why issuers would tolerate an extensive 
underpricing, in particular during the Internet bubble (Demers and Lewellen, 2003).   
Demers and Lewellen (2003) investigate a sample of Internet firms, where they show that 
underpricing is positively related to ex post Internet traffic. They furthermore show that the 
money left on the table as underpricing is below of the marginal cost of increased web 
traffic.  
In addition, they examine a larger sample of both Internet and non-Internet IPOs, showing 
that the marketing benefits associated with underpricing goes beyond web traffic. They use 
media exposure as an indirect proxy for marketing benefits, arguing that the effects on direct 
product market performance are too difficult to measure. In this study, they show that 
underpricing is positively related to publicity. 
Schaller (2004) also shows a significant, positive relationship in the subsequent month to the 
listing. She examines a sample of 76 Swiss IPOs comprising both Internet and non-Internet 
companies over a long period. However, she fails to find a significant relationship between 
underpricing and media coverage in the second month after going public. 
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3. Methodology  
From the literature review, we may see that previous studies have documented significant 
relationships between media exposure and underpricing. In this section, I make use of these 
observations to construct an empirical design in order to answer the questions raised in the 
introduction. 
As a starting point, it is worth notice that the literature implicitly distinguishes between ex 
ante and ex post media exposure. This distinction is important in terms of the direction of 
causality. While ex ante media exposure is assumed to cause underpricing, ex post media 
exposure is expected to be affected by underpricing. The empirical design of this study is 
therefore built on this distinction.  
 
3.1 Hypotheses  
According to the described literature on media exposure and underpricing, there are at least 
three reasonable hypotheses. The first and the second describe the relationship between ex 
ante media exposure and underpricing, while the third covers the impact of underpricing on 
ex post publicity.  
Hypothesis 1 finds legitimacy in DuCharme and Rajgopal’s (2001) article. 
Hypothesis 1: Media exposure in the week prior to the listing is related to underpricing 
through its influence on the aftermarket demand.  
Hypothesis 2 on the other hand, is in accordance with Liu, Sherman and Zhang’s (2006) 
article.  
Hypothesis 2a: Media exposure in the subscription period reflects information that is 
related to the pricing of the offering, and is thereby related to underpricing. 
Furthermore, Liu, Sherman and Zhang (2006) argue that this relationship is asymmetric. 
Media exposure only affects underpricing when the offering price is set above the midpoint 
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in the initial price range. However, when there is a downwards price adjustment, the article 
reports of no significant results.  
Hypothesis 2b: Media exposure is asymmetrically related to underpricing depending on 
whether the offering price is adjusted upwards or downwards relative to the midpoint of 
the initial price range.  
When it comes to the time after the listing, the expected cause and effect relationship is 
reversed. The third and final hypothesis is in accordance with Demers and Lewellen’s (2003) 
article, which proposes that underpricing creates publicity. 
Hypothesis 3: Underpricing creates media coverage, and thereby there is a relationship 
between underpricing and ex post media exposure.  
 
3.2 Construction of variables 
To measure underpricing (or overpricing), the initial first day return is defined as 
0
01
P
PPInitret −=
 
P0 is the final subscription price (IPO price), while P1 is the closing price on the first day of 
trading on the OSE. The final offering prices are collected from the listing prospectus 
published by the companies or from press releases published on OSE’s homepage. 
Furthermore, the first day closing price is taken from OSE’s homepage. 
To measure media exposure, the number of hits when searching the company names together 
with the word ‘børs’ (Norwegian for ‘stock exchange’) in the database A-tekst is used.  
Because news regarding the listing is most relevant to the scope of this study, the word 
‘børs’ is included in the search criteria. In this way, most of the news regarding other 
(irrelevant) events is excluded. I find this necessary due to the broad range of media sources 
included in the A-tekst database. When excluding this word, numerous, irrelevant news 
articles appear, which make no sense regarding the IPO. Furthermore, hits only containing 
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general daily market updates (such as share price tables etc.) are not taken into account. Only 
news articles are included.   
The observation periods are set according to the three developed hypotheses. To test 
hypothesis 1, the observation period is set to begin one week prior to the listing, and ends 
one day before the listing. The construction of this media variable is in accordance with 
DuCharme and Rajgopal’s (2001) article. The underlying idea is to test how media exposure 
impacts on the demand in the aftermarket. This construction would be reasonable since the 
IPO subscription period normally ends one week prior to the listing (on average 6.5 days in 
this sample). One would expect that media exposure in this week does not affect the IPO 
pricing.  
For the second hypothesis, the media observation period is identical to the subscription 
period. This construction is in accordance with Liu, Sherman and Zhang’s (2006) 
methodology. The underlying idea is to capture media articles revealing information on the 
final pricing.  
For hypothesis 2b, two additional media variables are constructed. These are supposed to 
capture any asymmetric relationship depending on whether there is a downwards or upwards 
price revision from the midpoint of the initial price range. This is also in accordance with 
Liu, Sherman and Zhang (2006): 
• ‘PositiveNews’ equals media hits in the subscription period, if the offering price is set 
above the midpoint in the initial price range. If otherwise, the variable is equal to 
zero. 
• ‘NegativeNews’ equals the number of media hits in the subscription period, if the 
offering price is set below the midpoint of the initial price range. If otherwise, the 
variable is equal to zero.  
Furthermore, to test hypothesis 3, I use ex post media hits, in accordance with Demers and 
Lewellen’s (2003) paper. First, I count media hits in the month after the listing. The 
observation period starts on the day of the listing, and ends one month minus one day after 
the listing. Thereafter, a variable for media hits in the second month ex post (starting one 
month after the listing and ending two months minus one day after the listing) is constructed. 
This is to investigate the persistence of the media coverage. 
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3.3 Construction of control variables 
Although the main scope is to investigate the relationship between underpricing and media 
exposure, the study still recognizes other causes to underpricing and media exposure. An 
empirical model should include variables that are expected to have a causal effect to the 
explained variable (Keller and Warrack, 2003). The construction of control variables, 
including the argumentation for the use of them, is explained in this section. 
 
3.3.1 Underpricing control variables 
The designed models used to test hypothesis 1 and 2 include controlling variables, which 
find legitimacy in the literature of underpricing.  
Control variables for testing ex ante media exposure on underpricing: 
• the oversubscription ratio (’OvrSub’) 
• relative price revision (‘PrRev’) 
• dummy variable for bookbuilding methods (‘Book’)  
• Hot market dummy (‘Hot’) 
• underwriter’s market share (‘MShare’)  
• dummy variable for venture capital backing (‘venture’)  
• the natural logarithm for company age (‘lnAge’) 
 
Oversubscription ratio 
The oversubscription ratio is a proxy on the demand for the offered shares. Chowdhry and 
Sherman (1996) argue that the oversubscription ratio reflects that offering price is set too 
low in order to assure a demand for the offered shares. They suggest that information about 
the discount is leaked to the market, inducing oversubscription.  
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Relative price adjustment 
Partial adjustment is controlled by the percentage price revision from the midpoint of the 
bookbuilding price range, relative to the size of the interval1. The underlying idea is that a 
positive price revision will only be partially adjusted to the demand learned through the 
bookbuilding process. Thereby one would expect a positive relationship between the relative 
price revision and the initial return. The method is in accordance with Hanley’s (1993) 
article. 
Bookbuilding 
Even though bookbuilding now seems to be the most frequently used IPO method in most of 
the world (Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm, 2003), we still find some IPOs using fixed 
pricing methods in this sample (9 out of 53 offerings). Bookbuilding is often assumed to lead 
to more accurate pricing, since it enables underwriters to estimate the demand in the pre-
market. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) test this assumption empirically, and find 
this to be true, at least for IPOs lead by US investment banks. In this study, a dummy 
variable, which is equal to one if bookbuilding is used, and zero for fixed price offerings test 
the effect of the choice of IPO method.  
Hot market 
Among the earliest observations in the literature of underpricing is that IPO activity is 
cyclical. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) introduced the term ‘hot market’ which they define as 
‘periods which the average first month performance (or aftermarket performance) of new 
issues is abnormally high’ (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975:1027). Later literature has characterized 
hot markets as periods when there is an unusually high IPO volume, exceeding underpricing 
and, from time to time, high concentrations within particular industries (Helwegee and 
Liang, 2002).  
In this study, a hot market is defined as a quarter of a year when the average underpricing 
exceeds the median quarterly average underpricing. After identifying hot periods, a dummy 
is constructed, which is equal to one if the observation lies within a period according to the 
developed definition. It should though, be mentioned that there exist alternative proxies for 
hot markets, where e.g. volume is frequently used (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
                                                 
1 Percentage price revision = (IPO price – Midpoint of the indicative price range)/ Midpoint of the indicative price range 
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Underwriter’s market share 
According to Booth and Smith’s (1986) model, underwriters use their reputation to certify 
that the issue is not overpriced. Thereby one may reduce the adverse selection problem and 
underpricing. However, studies of the late 90s (e.g. Beatty and Welch, 1996) reported that 
the sign of this relationship had changed to negative. Various researchers have contributed to 
explain this change. Some of these argue that issuers buy analyst coverage from reputable 
underwriters by allowing for underpricing, in order to gain attention in the aftermarket. Cliff 
and Jensen (2004) prove that increased underpricing follows lead underwriters with an all-
star analyst among their associates.  
The use of market share as a proxy for underwriter reputation is in accordance with the 
methodology developed by Megginson and Weiss’ (1991). Market share is defined as the 
investment bank’s relative share of the total gross proceedings in the sample. However, it is 
still worth noticing that there exist alternative methods to proxy underwriter reputation. 
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) argue that an underwriter would be concerned about the firm 
with which it is associated. According to them, proceedings alone give an inaccurate picture 
of reputation. They therefore use various criteria to rank underwriters, in accordance with the 
Carter-Manaster tombstone method (Carter and Manaster, 1990).   
Venture Capital 
In addition, it is also suggested that venture capital participation acts as certification for the 
quality of the IPO. Venture capital funds, which bring firms to the market at high frequency, 
will have an incentive to maintain a good reputation in order to gain access to the capital 
markets on favourable terms and to attract entrepreneurs of new projects. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) therefore argue that VC participation can be a credible signal to the financial 
markets, which would reduce the asymmetric information relation. They empirically show 
that IPOs backed by venture capital suffer less from underpricing than non-venture capital 
backed IPOs.  
To include the expected effect of VC participation, a dummy is constructed, which is equal 
to one in the cases where venture capital funds are found among the company’s investors, 
and zero otherwise.  
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Age 
Megginson and Weiss (1991), furthermore, show that age is negatively related to 
information asymmetry. This implies that older firms suffer less from underpricing than 
younger firms. 
This seems to be a reasonable expectation since older firms have a longer history of 
earnings, and often come from established industries. Younger firms, on the other hand, may 
lack a credible earning record and come from immature industries. Age is defined as the 
number of years between the corporation of the firm and the IPO. 
 
3.3.2 Media exposure control variables 
As with underpricing, other causes of media exposure are expected. These are relevant in 
designing a model for hypotheses 3.  
Control variables expected to account for media exposure: 
• The natural logarithm to gross proceedings (‘lnProceedings’) 
• A business-to-consumer dummy (‘B2C’) 
• Underwriter market share (‘MarketShare’) 
• A venture capital dummy (‘Venture’) 
• A hot market dummy (‘HotMarket’) 
 
Gross proceeding 
Gross proceeding is included on the assumption that large IPOs attract more public attention. 
Demers and Lewellen (2003) report a significant positive relation between proceedings and 
media coverage in the months subsequent to the IPO. The constructed variable includes the 
proceedings obtained from selling primary and secondary equity. 
Business-to-Consumer relationship 
The B2C dummy is equal to one if the company has a direct relationship to the end users of 
its product, otherwise zero. This is to control for the assumption that B2C companies gain 
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60more marketing benefits by going public. It is therefore assumed that they will put more 
effort into attracting publicity (Demers and Lewellen, 2003). 
Underwriter market share 
Furthermore, Demers and Lewellen (2003), argue that reputable underwriters are more 
closely followed by media, and therefore increase ex post media coverage. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) argue that highly reputable underwriters are likely to select IPOs that attract 
media coverage.  
Venture Capital 
Demers and Lewellen (2003) also control for whether venture capital participation may 
attract increased media coverage. However, they fail to find any significant relationship here. 
The variable is still included, since reputable venture capital funds are likely to be followed 
by the press.  
Hot market dummy 
It would furthermore be reasonable to assume that media exposure is affected by the activity 
in the IPO markets. When firms go public frequently, one should assume that the media take 
interest in this activity. Alternatively, when firms seldom go public, it could be easier to 
catch the media’s attention. A hot market dummy is constructed to capture these 
possibilities. 
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4. Data sample  
The sample used in the analysis includes 54 IPOs launched on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
(OSE), in the period 2003-2006. The period is selected due to its relatively high number of 
IPOs. In this period, a total of 105 new listings were reported on the OSE. Furthermore, this 
period was chosen as a matter of practical concerns and time constraints. It was difficult to 
collect data from earlier periods, due to de-listings, mergers, de-mergers or bankruptcies. 
51 listings are excluded from the sample. These listings have either made no public offering 
in connection to the listing, the companies are cross-listed (the company is already listed on 
another stock exchange) or it has simply been too difficult to find relevant data on the IPOs. 
Only primary listings, which announce public offerings in their listing prospectus, are 
included.  
The company data is primarily hand collected from company web sites and the OSE’s home 
page. However, since companies have various policies on which information they publish, it 
was also necessary to get some private information directly from the companies and from 
IPO underwriters. This is true in particular for the data on oversubscription ratios and gross 
proceedings.  
All the data on media coverage is collected from the A-tekst database. This is maintained by 
Norway’s largest and most significant newspapers and newswires2. The database is chosen 
for its significant coverage of Norwegian media, and accessibility. Having free access to the 
database’s online services played a major role in this choice.   
One should however, be aware that news from Finansavisen (Norway’s second largest 
business newspaper, with a high focus on financial news), international media, Internet 
media or from broadcasting media is not included. These media are omitted due to time 
constraints and feasibility. 
                                                 
2 Aftenposten, Advokatbladet, Adresseavisen, avis1, Bergen Tidende, Dagbladet, Dagens Næringsliv, Dagsavisen, 
Klassekampen, Kommunal rapport, Nordlys, Økonomisk rapport, NTBtekst, Teknisk ukeblad and Hvem Hva Hvor 
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5. Descriptive data 
The average underpricing for this sample is 3.35 %, where NOK 798 million3 was left on the 
table; an average of NOK 14.78 million per IPO. In total NOK 23.82 billion was raised 
through IPOs in the period; on average NOK 441 million per IPO. 
The average initial return is approximately at same level as in Samuelsen and Tveter’s thesis 
(2006), which studies the OSE IPOs in the period 2004-2005. However, it is somewhat 
lower than found in previous periods in Norway for example, Edvardsen (2005) reports the 
average underpricing in the period 1997-2004 to be 11.25 %. Furthermore, the average 
underpricing in this sample seems to be somewhat low compared to international studies 
(Ritter 2003). The relative underpricing could, however, be due to a small sample and short 
period.  
Furthermore, we may observe that there is an annual variance. In the period 2003-2005, the 
average underpricing is remarkably low, but is significantly increased by 2006.  
 
Table 1: Underpricing across year   
Year No. of 
observations 
Average 
initial return
Median St.dev Total proceedings 
(NOK) 
2003 2 -2.26 %    N/A 9.82% 367,500,000 
2004 11 1.89 %    0.00 % 5.34% 1,915,589,640 
2005 25 2.50 %    1.54 % 8.26% 9,112,596,150 
2006 16 6.65 %    4.96 % 9.91% 12,426,005,008 
2003-2006 54 3.35 % 1.54 % 8.48% 23,821,690,798 
     
Table 1 displays average underpricing and proceedings  across years.      
 
The period from the 4th quarter in 2004 to the 3rd quarter in 2005, and furthermore the 1st-3rd 
quarters in 2006, are defined as hot periods according to the definition developed in the 
methodology chapter. The average underpricing in the hot markets is 5.6 %, while the same 
                                                 
3 Calculated by multiplying proceedings with the average underpricing. 
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is reported to be 1.07 % in the cold markets. Further statistics on this are presented in 
appendix 2 (table A5). 
There is a variance between sectors as well, where the energy and information technology 
sectors experience the highest average underpricing (6.17 % and 4.58 % respectively).  
In terms of proceedings, the information technology sector on average raised the most capital 
through IPOs, compared to other sectors. The average proceeding in this sector (NOK 822 
million) is nearly twice is high as in the energy and industrials sectors (NOK 453.6 and 
452.9 million respectively). Further statistics across sectors are presented in appendix 3 
(table A6). 
Furthermore, as seen from table 2, the average underpricing for IPOs with venture capital 
backing is in fact higher than for non-venture capital IPOs. This contradicts the proposal that 
firms with venture capital suffer less from underpricing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
However, other effects are likely to play in. Venture capital backed firms are, as an example, 
on average younger when they go public. This may indicate on higher ex ante uncertainty.  
On the other hand, companies that use bookbuilding methods are connected to a lower 
average underpricing. Nine of the companies in the sample use fixed price offerings, with an 
average underpricing of 8.72 %. As may also be seen, IPOs that use bookbuilding methods 
raise twice as much capital as fixed price offerings.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on initial returns across firm and offering characteristics 
Firm/offer 
characteristics 
No. of 
obs. Mean Median St.dev. 
Venture Capital 
backing 
22 4.14 % 0.09 % 8.85% 
Non-venture capital 
backing 32 2.97 % 1.54 % 
8.08% 
Hot market 28 5.6 % 2.83 % 7.67 % 
Cold market 26 1.07 % 0.00 % 8.72 % 
Fixed price offering 9 8.72 % 8.42 % 7.74 % 
Bookbuilding 45 2.38 % 0.00 % 10.37 % 
B2C 14 2.20 % 1.67 % 8.92 % 
B2B 40 3.91 % 0.00 % 8.39 % 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on the initial return across firm and offering characteristics 
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Concerning media exposure, there is a significant increase in media hits in the month of 
going public (table 3). The average number of media hits is significantly higher in the month 
prior to and in the month after the listing (7.25 and 6.98). The average more than doubles 
from the second month prior to being listed, to the listing month. However, the average 
number of news items drops to the approximate same level in the second month after the 
listing. This may indicate that the media attention gained by going public does not appear to 
be persistent.    
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on media exposure 
 Mean Median StDev 
NI-1week 1,623     1,000   1,934     
NISub 2,585     2,000   2,818     
NI-2 months 2,717     2,000   3,146     
NI-1 month 5,811     5,000   4,570     
NI +1 month 6,585     5,000   5,882     
NI+2 months 3,075     2,000   3,234     
    
Table 3 displays average and median media coverage for each media observation period. 
 
As expected, as seen from table 4, B2C companies receive more attention from the media 
than B2B companies. There are in total 14 B2C companies in the sample. These are subject 
to more media exposure in all the observation periods. It is, however, interesting to notice 
that this gap increases around the time of going public. While the difference is not even 
statistically significant one month before the listing (NI-2 months), B2Cs receive twice as much 
media attention in the month after the listing (10.71 news items on average, compared to 
5.10 for B2B companies).  
In terms of media exposure and price revisions, it is difficult to see any clear patterns. 
However, companies which have made an upwards price revision receive nearly twice as 
much press attention in the month after going public. Furthermore, the average number of 
news articles in the subscription period differs only marginally depending on an upwards and 
a downwards price revision (2.7 articles compared to 2.9 on average). This is somewhat 
surprising. According to hypothesis 2a, there should be an asymmetric relationship 
depending on the direction of the price revision. However, NISub and the relative price 
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revision variable display a negative Pearson correlation coefficient (See appendix 5 for 
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix).   
It is also worth noticing that IPOs that use bookbuilding methods receive more media 
attention in all the observation periods, except in the second month ex post. The difference is 
particularly large in the subscription period (2.8 compared to 1.1 on average). 
Furthermore, regarding media exposure and the initial return, it is worth noticing that 
overpriced offerings on average receive significantly more media attention in the 
subscription period than underpriced offerings (appendix 3, diagram A2). However, this is 
reversed when it comes to ex post media exposure, where highly underpriced offerings 
receive more media exposure (appendix 3, diagram A3). 
  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on media exposure across firm and offer characteristics 
Offer/firm characteristics NI -2 months NI - 1 month NI+1 month NI+2 months NI-1 week NISub 
Venture 2.39 5.94 6.45 2.90 1.32 2.45 
Non-venture 3.18 5.64 6.77 3.32 2.05 2.77 
Hot 3.28 6.88 6.32 2.72 1.72 3.12 
Cold market 2.21 4.86 6.82 3.39 1.54 2.11 
Fixed price offering 1.67 3.44 4.22 4.11 0.89 1.11 
Bookbuilding 2.93 6.30 7.07 2.86 1.77 2.89 
B2C 3.71 7.79 10.71 3.43 2.36 3.79 
B2B 2.36 5.10 5.10 2.95 1.36 2.15 
Upwards price revision 3.05 6.63 9.47 2.63 1.84 2.74 
Downwards price revision 2.92 6.04 5.50 3.23 1.69 2.92 
       
Table 4 displays the average news hits for each observation period across offering and firm characteristics 
 
Pearson’s correlation tests for underpricing and media exposure show negative coefficient 
values for all the media variables, but for NI+1 month. However, the coefficients are 
remarkably low, except for NISub, which display a significant negative correlation with the 
initial return variable (Pearson correlation coefficient matrix is presented in appendix 5).   
As a temporary summary on the descriptive statistics, there is underpricing present, even 
though it is somewhat low compared to previous studies. Furthermore, there seems to be a 
variance in underpricing depending on offering and firm characteristics. Media coverage is 
also significantly increased in the month of the IPO. However, media exposure does not 
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seem to be persistent. Finally, Pearson’s correlation coefficients indicate a relationship 
between underpricing and media exposure, depending on which observation period is looked  
at.    
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6. Multivariate analysis and discussion 
So far, there appears to be a relationship between media exposure and initial return. 
However, other effects might cause these apparent relationships, and tests, which include 
control variables, are carried out. 
 
6.1 Ex ante media exposure on underpricing 
To test for whether media coverage in the time before going public is related to the initial 
return, the following multiple regression is run: 
InitialReturn =  β0 + β1 *’NIt’ + β2 *‘MShare’ + β3*’OvrSub’ + β4* ‘lnAge’ + β5 * ‘PrRev’ 
+ β6* ‘Book’ + β7*’Venture’ + β8*’Hot’  
 
6.1.1 Results 
The results, reported in regression 1 (table 5), show that media exposure in the week prior to 
going public (NI-1 week) is not significantly related to underpricing. This is rejected on a rather 
high significance level (p-value = 80 %). The rejection is in contradiction to DuCharme and 
Rajgopal’s (2001) article, as well with Staikouras and Tsatsanis (2004). The results therefore 
do not support the argument that media coverage in the week prior to going public affects 
demand in the aftermarket.  
When it comes to media exposure in the subscription period (NIsub), a significant negative 
relationship to the initial return is shown (results presented in regression 2, table 5). 
According to the regression, each article reduces underpricing by 0.7 %. This is significant at 
a 10 % level. However, note that this is after removing the percentage price revision 
variable. This is removed due to its correlation with the oversubscription ratio and the hot 
market dummy. The removal however, does not change the value of the underpricing 
coefficient.  
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Furthermore, when including the variables, which measure media coverage for negative and 
positive price revisions separately, the relationship is asymmetrical. ‘NegativeNews’ (equal 
to the number of news items if there is a negative price revision in the initial price range, and 
zero otherwise) is negatively related to underpricing. However, this is not true for the 
opposite variable, ‘PositiveNews’ (equalling the number of news items if there is a positive 
price revision). ‘NegativeNews’ is significant at a 5 % level, displaying a coefficient which is 
equal to -0.9 %.  
The economic significance of these findings suggests that for each additional news article in 
the subscription period, the issuer left NOK 3.09m less on the table. This is based on the 
average proceeding per IPO (NOK 441m). The effect is even stronger for companies that 
revise their offering price downwards in the subscription period. Each article was followed 
by a NOK 3.97 million reduction.  
 
Table 5: Regression results on the initial return as the explained variable 
 Regression 1 Regression 2
Constant -0.02756 -0.00693 
 (-0.97) (-0.24) 
’NIt’ 0.001223 -0.00718*
 (0.22) (-1.91) 
’MShare’ -0.1038 -0.0625 
 (-0.75) (-0.46) 
’OverSub’ 0.008328*** 0.00909***
 (3.78) (4.23) 
’lnAge’ 0.005139 0.004786 
 (0.62) (0.62) 
’Book’ -0.07236** -0.05904**
 (2.67) (2.24) 
’Venture’ -0.00061 0.0042 
 (-0.03) (0.21) 
’Hot’ 0.00907 0,00017 
 (0.39) (0.01) 
R2 (adj) 27.7 % 33.1 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % 
levels respectively. 
 
Table 5 displays the results of a multivariate analysis on the relationship between underpricing and ex ante 
media exposure. ‘Regression 1’ tests this relationship using media coverage in the week prior to the offering, 
while ‘Regression 2’ uses the media exposure in the subscription period.  
 
 31
 
6.1.2 Discussion 
There is no evidence present in this sample for claiming that media in the week prior to 
going public fuels any demand in the aftermarket. It must though be underlined that the 
results are based on a small sample, and must be interpreted with a great caution. However, a 
couple of reasons may support the failure to find a significant relationship. To begin with, 
DuCharme and Rajgopal’s (2001) study a pure sample consisting of Internet companies, 
while this sample has companies from a wide range of industries. Furthermore, they study a 
sample from the Internet bubble period, a time when extreme underpricing and media 
interest was experienced. Ritter and Welch (2001) argue that the high underpricing in this 
period should be explained by behavioural and agency conflict theories. It is, however, 
reasonable to believe that there has been a shift in investor psychology since then, implying 
that media hype does not drive underpricing. 
When it comes to media coverage in the subscription period, the finding of a negative 
relationship does not support that media coverage can be used to prove Benveniste and 
Spindt’s model (1989). According to Liu, Sherman and Zhang’s (2006) proposal, informed 
investors repeat their private information to the media after revealing it to the issuer. 
Furthermore, they argue that investors would do so in order to increase the demand in the 
aftermarket to induce a quick return (‘flipping’).   
However, the counterargument would be that most investors have a longer time perspective. 
Aggarwal (2003) reports in his study of US IPOs, that flipping accounts for only 19 % of the 
trading volume in the first two days after the listing. He also found that hot IPOs are more 
likely to be flipped, than cold IPOs. Furthermore, investment banks are in general reluctant 
to permit flipping, because it drives stock prices downward, he says. The failure of finding a 
positive relationship here could therefore be due to informed pre-market investors not 
attempting to stimulate the immediate demand in the aftermarket in order to flip. In addition, 
investors may expect that pre-listing media coverage has no or only a small effect on the 
aftermarket demand, as reported above.  
The negative relationship, on the other hand, is likely to be due to media coverage in the 
subscription period related to a reduced adverse selection in the pre-market. The results are 
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thereby more consistent with the winner’s curse model developed by Rock (1986). This 
would imply that the uninformed investor’s fear of a winner’s curse reduces with increased 
media coverage.   
Furthermore, the results give support for claiming that there is a negative asymmetric 
relationship in the sample, even though the evidence is weak. This is based on underpricing 
being negatively related to media coverage when there is a downwards price revision in the 
initial price range. According to the regression results, each published news article in the 
subscription period is followed by 0.9 % lower underpricing when the offering price is set 
below the midpoint. However, there is no significant positive relationship when the price is 
adjusted upwards. It must though be emphasized that the possibility of a type 1 error 
(rejection of a true null hypothesis) is most present here, due to a small sample.   
A negative asymmetric relationship contradicts with Liu, Sherman and Zhang’s (2006) 
proposal. However, one can still find rational arguments to the finding. To begin with, one 
should be aware that a negative price revision does not necessarily mean that negative 
information is revealed. It could, on the other hand, also reflect that the midrange of the price 
range is close to the real value. This could furthermore imply that the preliminary research 
conducted by the issuer and its underwriters has revealed most of the relevant information 
regarding the valuation. Thereby, in accordance with Benveniste and Spindt’s model (1989), 
institutional investors would have little positive information to contribute, which would 
reduce their incentives to participate in the offering.  
Due to the moderate interest among institutional investors, reflected by the negative price 
revision, it would be reasonable to assume that issuers put more effort into promoting the 
offering to retail investors. Furthermore, news articles where the company explains their 
competitive advantages, business model, business risk, choice of underwriter, company 
funding etc. would probably educate the uninformed investors and reduce the fear of a 
winner’s curse. In this case, the findings would be in line with Rock’s model (1986).  
Alternatively, though not necessarily in conflict with the argumentation above, there is likely 
to be a bias due to endogeneity. This would imply that media coverage is somehow 
dependent on underpricing. Possibly, one might think that the press prefers to report on 
offerings which are surrounded by little information asymmetry. Keep in mind that the 
media is reliant on its reputation. It would therefore be reasonable to regard newspapers’ 
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credibility as a function of the accuracy in what they report. In this context, one could 
assume that journalists would prefer to write stories on companies or industries which they 
have prior knowledge of, or on information that can be easily certified. Assuming that the 
press’ willingness to report on an offering is positively dependent on the reliability of public 
information, media coverage would increase when there is a high probability of a low 
underpricing.  
To test for endogeneity, a Hausman test is run (the proceedings and results of this test are 
presented in appendix 6). This test displays that endogeneity is present, which is significant 
at a 1 % level. However, it may seem that underpricing still has a rather small effect on 
media coverage in the subscription period. The coefficient value of the ‘InitRet’ coefficient 
in the first step regression,4 is estimated to be -7.71. This implies that when underpricing is 
decreased by one per cent, media coverage only increases by 0.0771 articles. Furthermore,  
NISub is only marginally reduced in the second step. It may therefore seem as if endogeneity 
is present, but does not have any significant impact.  
A third alternative explanation however, is more obscure, but still possible. This is based on 
the observation that overpriced offerings receive significantly more media attention in the 
subscription period. I therefore test whether media exposure is determined by the probability 
of overpricing. An argument for such a relationship could be that analysts or similar experts 
may use the media to warn investors from investing in overpriced stocks, perhaps in order to 
gain reputation and credibility (or informed competitors may want to discredit the offering).  
A regression using ‘NISub’ as the explained variable is run. This model is controlled against 
the media exposure control variables, described in the methodology chapter. In addition, a 
dummy for overpricing is added, which is equal to one if there is a negative first day return 
on the IPO shares, otherwise zero. 
The results of this regression show that media coverage is negatively dependent on 
underpricing. Furthermore, the media coverage is positively related to the overpricing 
dummy, but insignificant at a rather high level (p-value = 50 %). I thereafter run a regression 
where I add a variable which is equal to negative initial returns (overpricing), but zero for 
                                                 
4 The Hausmann test method uses a two-step procedure. In the first step, a regression on NISub is run as the explained 
variable. While in the second step, a regression on InitRet is run, with the fitted values from the first step as a regressor. A 
more detailed explanation on the procedure is provided in the appendix.  
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positives (underpricing). This variable (named ‘overprice’), is insignificant as well (even 
when removing ‘Initret’ and the dummy). In addition, it does not seem plausible to believe 
that the media is better informed than pre-market investors are. I therefore choose to reject 
this possibility. The results are presented in appendix 4 (table A10). 
 
6.1.3 Analysis of control variables 
Regarding the control variables, percentage price revision from the bookbuilding midrange, 
the bookbuilding dummy and the oversubscription ratio variables show significant 
relationships to underpricing. They are all significant at a 5 % level. However, note that the 
percentage price revision variable is not significant even at a 10 % level. This is, however, 
probably due to multicollinearity. Preliminary tests show that this variable is correlated to 
both media coverage and the oversubscription ratio (appendix 5). However, a regression, 
which excludes media coverage and oversubscription, displays that percentage price revision 
is significantly positively related to underpricing. This supports the partial adjustment 
argument. 
It is, furthermore, notably that the fixed price offering dummy is significant and displays a 
rather high coefficient value. According to the coefficient estimate, underpricing increases 
by 6 % when a fixed price offering method is used. This is in accordance with Benveniste 
and Spindt’s suggestion (1989), saying that private information is revealed through 
bookbuilding. However, the results are somewhat interesting since Ljungqvist, Jenkinson 
and Wilhelm (2003) report that bookbuilding methods are most effective when the IPO is 
lead by a US investment bank. In fact, their findings show that European fixed price 
offerings proved to suffer less from underpricing, than IPOs using bookbuilding methods. 
They argue that US banks have an advantage due to more experience in bookbuilding and 
better access to informed US investors. Since this sample is dominated by Scandinavian 
investment banks, these results may imply that the regional investment banks are in 
possession of the needed experience and utilize the advantages of bookbuilding methods. 
However, since there are rather few fixed price offerings in a rather small sample, these 
results should be interpreted with the greatest caution.  
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When it comes to the insignificant variables, they should still be discussed due to the 
probability of a type 1 error.  
To begin with venture capital, it is surprising to see that this variable displays a positive 
coefficient. As mentioned, previous studies (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991) suggest that 
venture capital participation acts as a certification and thereby reduces the adverse selection 
problem. However, the venture capital industry is still in its early stages in Norway, and the 
lack of relationship could be due to the venture capital industry not having yet built a 
sufficient reputation to act as a reliable signal in IPOs. In addition, it must be added that the 
construction of the variable as a dummy, does not take the quality of the venture capital 
participation into account. A more accurate measurement of venture capital reputation could 
have given another picture.  
The underwriter market share and firm age variables display respectively negative and 
positive relationships in all regressions. This is expected and in line with the literature. The 
lack of significance could be due to the small sample, as much as to a lack of relationship. 
Furthermore, it is worth questioning whether the results could have been different if one had 
used the Carter-Manaster tombstone method (Carter and Manaster, 1990) to proxy for 
underwriter reputation.  
The hot period variable is insignificant at a high significance level (close to 100 %). In 
addition, its coefficient is remarkably low, which implies on that a hot period only increases 
underpricing by 0.02 %. This must be regarded as economically insignificant.   
 
6.2 Underpricing on ex post media exposure 
In testing hypothesis 3, the impact of underpricing on ex post media coverage, the following 
regression is run:  
NIt = β0 + β1*’Initret’ + ‘β2’lnProc’+ ‘β3*B2C’ + β4*’MShare’ + β5* ‘Venture’ + β6*’Hot’ 
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6.2.1 Results 
The results show a positive relationship between underpricing and media exposure in the 
first month after going public. This is significant at a 10% level. For every underpricing 
percentage, media coverage increases by 0.15 articles, or one article per 6.67% underpricing. 
In absolute numbers, NOK 29.41 million is left on the table per article. 
However, when the observation period is set to the second month after the listing (NI+2 
months), none of the independent variables display any significant relationship to media 
coverage. The R2-value is furthermore close to zero, indicating that the designed model has 
no explanatory power. This is true even when changing model specifications, e.g. by 
transforming variables into their natural logarithm and square root.    
 
Table 6: Regression results on ex post media exposure as the explained variable 
 Regression 3 Regression 4
Constant -12.437 0.95 
 (-1.29) (0.15) 
‘Initret’ 15.383* -2.744 
 (1.72) (-0.48) 
‘lnProc’ 0.8222 5.219 
 (1.57) (0.82) 
‘B2C’ 5.86*** 0.0474 
 (3.48) (0.14) 
’Venture’ 0,6 0.5283 
 (0.39) (0.55) 
‘MShare’ 11.211 0.602 
 (1.12) (0.56) 
‘Hot’ 0.598 0.711 
 (0.38) (0.71) 
R2 (adjusted) 20.50 % 0.00 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Table 6 displays the results of a multivariate analysis on the relationship between underpricing and ex post 
media exposure. ‘Regression 3’ reports the estimates for the regression run on NI+1 month  as the explained 
variable, while ‘Regression 4’ is run on ‘NI+2 months’.  
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6.2.2 Discussion 
The positive relationship between NI+1 month and the initial return is expected and in line with 
previous studies. It is therefore reasonable to conclude on that underpricing is statistically 
related to increased publicity in the month after going public.   
However, despite of the statistical relationship, it is still worth elaborating on the economic 
significance. The money left on the table per article exceeds what is reasonable to believe the 
average firm would be willing to pay for marginal publicity. As a comparison, one could 
mention that a double page advertisement in Dagens Næringsliv costs NOK 348,150 (June 
11th 2007, www.dn.no).  
A back of the envelope calculation, assuming that a news item is worth NOK 1 million 
(which is probably a conservative estimate), shows that the motivation for increased 
publicity only accounts for approximately 3 % of the money left on the table5. It therefore 
seems reasonable to argue that product marketing benefits are rather insignificant in 
explaining underpricing on the OSE. 
As an argument supporting this, one could point out that only 14 out of 54 companies in the 
sample are categorized as B2C companies. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the energy 
sector accounts for more than 50 % of the OSE’s total market capitalization (figures from 24 
January 2007, www.ose.no). Furthermore, Norway is normally regarded as a small and an 
open economy, where a significant part of the trade is reliant on international markets. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that increased domestic publicity is not an important factor in 
terms of product marketing when going public on the OSE.  
One should though, be aware that the economic significance would probably be larger if 
news from Finansavisen, international media, broadcastings and internet media were 
included in the media variables.  
                                                 
5 1 million divided by the average underpricing (in absolute numbers) per article.  
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However, though product marketing aspects seem to play a minor role in explaining 
underpricing on the OSE, increased publicity still could have positive effects. Among others, 
it is reasonable to assume that media coverage raises awareness of a company among 
aftermarket investors. This may lead to better terms in the capital market at a later stage. In 
this context, it is worth noticing that the relationship between media coverage and the initial 
return switches signs in the time between the IPO subscription period and the listing. It is 
reasonable to assume that the latter group of firms relates to more ex ante uncertainty due to 
its larger underpricing. However, after going public, these firms receive more media 
coverage, which may decrease the related asymmetric information problem assumed prior to 
going public. This study however, does not offer any evidence to make any conclusion 
regarding this suggestion.   
When it comes to media exposure in the second month after the listing, no significant 
statistical relationship to underpricing is found, but remains robust even when changing 
model specifications. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the developed model is only 
able to explain media exposure in the immediate time after going public. I therefore choose 
to reject that underpricing has a persistent effect on publicity. However, there are likely to be 
variables outside the model causing media coverage. The exclusion of a significant variable 
can induce type 1 errors, and the interpretation of these results should be conducted with 
caution (Brooks, 2002).  
   
6.2.3 Analysis of control variables 
Among the control variables, only the B2C dummy displays a significant coefficient value 
when including all the control variables in a regression on NI+1 month. However, when 
removing insignificant variables (lnAge, Venture and Hot) and running MShare and lnProc 
in separate regressions, both of these variables are statistically significant (table A12, 
appendix 4). This is done due to the suspicion of multicollinearity.  
These findings therefore suggest that there is positive relationship between ex post media 
coverage and underwriter’s reputation. Furthermore, the offering size coefficient also 
displays a positive sign, indicating that aftermarket publicity is positively related to the size 
 39
of the IPO. The findings also show that B2C companies are subject to significantly more 
media coverage in the first month after the listing. 
In terms of the insignificant variables, they are all rejected at a high significance level (over 
50 %). However, it is still worth mentioning that the hot market and the venture dummies 
show positive signs. lnAge, on the other hand, displays a negative sign.  
Regarding the control variables included in the regression run on NI+2 months, I choose to not 
elaborate on these, due to the model’s low explanatory power.  
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7. Robustness  
The results so far show that IPO underpricing is significantly related to media coverage in 
the subscription period and ex post listing. A number of concerns, however, arise in 
discussing these findings. Most important is the size of the sample, which is crucial in 
evaluating the validity. Compared to most international studies referred to, the size of this 
sample is rather small. 
However, some robustness checks are made in order to test the results. To begin with, the 
findings are robust when they are controlled against variables that are assumed to be related 
the explained variables. Furthermore, all the variable coefficients which are central to the 
scope of this study and reported as significant, are stable even when removing insignificant 
control variables one by one, and in different combinations. This is important since multiple 
regressions on small samples are sensitive to the number of variables used (Brooks, 2002).  
The rejection of hypothesis 1 should though, be elaborated on, since there is a possibility of a 
type 1 error. The rejection is, however, robust even when removing coefficients in different 
combinations. NI-1 week change coefficient values and even signs, which indicate on sensitive 
estimates dependent on changing model specifications. In addition, it seems plausible that 
the investor psychology of this sample differs from what DuCharme and Rajgopal (2001) 
build their study on. 
Furthermore, a few extreme observations are made, which could greatly influence the 
coefficients in all the regressions. These could also violate the assumptions of the Ordinary 
Least Square method (Brooks, 2002). I therefore remove ‘Aker Kværner’ (due to extreme 
media coverage), ‘SeaBird Exploration’ (extreme underpricing) and ‘Grenland Group’ 
(extreme underpricing) from the sample. These are removed due to suggestions from the 
statistical software (Minitab). 
The removals however, do not change the statistical significance of the relationship between 
media coverage and underpricing. On the other hand, the coefficients are somewhat reduced. 
However, underwriter’s reputation, the hot market dummy and age all now turn out to be 
significant, at a 10 % level. This is in line with theory suggestions, supporting that these are 
significantly related to underpricing. However, the fixed price offering dummy now turns out 
to be insignificant, and its coefficient is remarkably reduced (but still positive). This is 
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probably due to Grenland Group’s fixed price offering, and I therefore do not reject that the 
IPO method is related to underpricing. The results of these regressions are presented in 
appendix 4 (table A14 and A15).   
However, concerns are present. As pointed out, there is likely to be a simultaneous causality 
between NISub and the initial return. A Hausman test shows that NISub cannot be rejected as 
an endogenous variable. On the other hand, it must be underlined that a Hausman test would 
preferably require a larger sample than the case here. The results from this test should 
therefore be interpreted as an indication of simultaneity. It would therefore be desirable to 
examine the implication of simultaneity on a larger sample. 
Another major concern relates to the data on oversubscription ratios. The reader should be 
aware that the original data is missing information on the oversubscription ratios for eight 
companies. These companies were reluctant to reveal this information. For the missing 
cases, I have therefore chosen to set the ratio to one. I argue that the reason why this 
information is not made public is most probably that the offering has not been 
oversubscribed. 
In any case, even after robustness checks, the findings should be interpreted with great 
caution. A study on a larger sample would be highly desirable. 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the relationship between ex ante media coverage and underpricing, 
and secondly, how underpricing affects ex post media exposure.  
The findings show that media coverage in the subscription period is significantly negatively 
related to underpricing. Companies that were followed by the media left NOK 3.09 million 
less on the table per news article. Furthermore, I also find (weak) evidence to conclude that 
media coverage is asymmetrically related to underpricing. The relationship depends on 
whether the price revision is revised upwards or downwards from the midpoint of the 
bookbuilding price range. When prices are revised downwards, there is a significant 
relationship. However, there is no evidence of a significant relationship in the opposite 
direction, implying an asymmetric relationship. 
However, due to suspicion of endogeneity, I do not make any conclusion about causality. On 
the other hand, I would suggest that future studies on this topic examine the likely effect of 
simultaneity (e.g. by using a 2SLS method). This could give a clearer picture of the 
underlying cause to the relationship. 
However, the findings still show that offerings that receive media coverage are related to 
lower underpricing.   
I furthermore reject the hypothesis claiming that media coverage in the week prior to going 
public creates hype, fuelling the demand for the shares in the aftermarket. Such particular 
explanations arose in connection with the Internet bubble, but there is no evidence present 
for such a proposal here. This is probably because this sample contains IPOs from a wider 
range of industries and from a different period than is the case for studies focusing on the 
dotcom era.  
When it comes to underpricing and media exposure in the time after going public, there is a 
significant positive relationship in the first month ex post. This finding is in accordance with 
those of previous studies.  
However, despite the finding of a positive relationship, I still reject that underpricing is 
deliberately motivated by product marketing benefits. This is based on the economic 
insignificance of the findings. According to the results, if the sole purpose of underpricing 
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was to increase publicity, it would cost on average, NOK 29.4 million to achieve one 
additional news article. This figure must, however, be regarded as an upper limit, since there 
are various motives behind underpricing. A back of the envelope calculation, assuming that 
one additional article is worth NOK 1 million, shows that the marginal publicity only 
accounts for approximately 3 % of the money left on the table. I therefore find that product 
marketing benefits play a rather minor role in explaining underpricing on the OSE.  
However, I suggest that increased publicity, which is related to underpricing, can still have a 
positive impact in order to achieve better terms when returning to the primary capital market. 
This study does not investigate this possibility. A study on the relationship between the OSE 
performance and IPO media exposure is therefore suggested. 
Furthermore, I find reasons to reject that underpricing has any persistent effect on media 
coverage, since there is no significant relationship between underpricing and media coverage 
in the second month after the listing. This is also in line with previous findings from 
literature. 
However, the analysis is based on a small sample, and all of these findings should therefore 
be interpreted with the greatest caution. The conclusion should therefore be that a 
relationship between media exposure and IPO performance is shown, which is worth closer 
investigation, preferably on a larger sample  
For future studies, I would furthermore find it interesting to investigate how different news 
characteristics are related to underpricing. This would require categorization of news 
depending on what is reported, giving a more detailed picture on the interplay between 
media exposure and IPO performance. This is not included in this study due to time 
constraints. 
As a final remark, even though it is not within the scope of this thesis, I also find it worth 
mentioning the high number of companies going public without making any public offering. 
An article by Derrien and Kecskès (2007) examine such listings on the London Stock 
Exchange, and point out a list of possible explanations to this phenomenon. I therefore 
suggest that future studies might investigate why companies go public on the OSE without 
making any public offering.
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Sample selection 
 
Table A1: Sample 
Company name Ticker 
Date of 
listing  Company  name Ticker 
Date of 
listing 
Ability Group AGR 03.07.2006  Grenland Group GGG 12.12.2005 
Active 24 ACTIVE 12.11.2004  Havila Shipping  HAVI 24.05.2005 
Aker American Shipping AKASA 11.07.2005  Kongsberg Automotive Holding KOA 24.06.2005 
Aker Kværner AKVER 02.04.2004  Mamut ASA MAMUT 10.05.2004 
AKVA Group AKVA 10.11.2006  Marine Farms MAFA 12.10.2006 
APL ASA APL 18.03.2005  Media & Research Group MRG 23.09.2005 
Artumas Group Inc. AGI 08.07.2005  Medi-Stim MEDI 28.05.2004 
Awilco Offshore AWO 11.05.2005  NextGenTel Holding NEXT 19.12.2003 
Bergesen Worldwide Gas GAS 25.10.2005  NorDiag NORD 14.12.2005 
Biotec Pharmacon BIOTEC 04.11.2005  Norgani Hotels NORGAN 16.11.2005 
Bjørge BJORGE 17.12.2004  
Norway Energy & Marine 
Insurance NEMI 07.06.2005 
Block Watne Gruppen ASA BWG 17.03.2006  Norwegian Air Shuttle NAS 18.12.2003 
Camillo Eitzen & Co  CECO 28.06.2004  Norwegian Property NPRO 15.11.2006 
Catch Communications CATCH 29.03.2004  Odim ODIM 18.11.2005 
Cermaq CEQ 24.10.2005  Opera OPERA 11.03.2004 
Clavis Pharma CLAVIS 07.07.2006  Oslo Areal ASA OSLO 03.05.2005 
Codfarmers COD 19.10.2006  Pertra PERTRA 10.11.2006 
Consafe Offshore                    CONSA 26.09.2005  
Petrobank Energy and 
Resources Ltd PBG 08.02.2006 
Conseptor  CNS 24.06.2004  Petrojack ASA JACK 23.02.2005 
Crew Minerals CMI 21.12.2006  Polimoon POLI 26.04.2005 
Dolphin Interconnect 
Solutions DOLP 20.04.2006  Powel POWEL 24.10.2005 
DynaPel Systems DYNA 27.01.2005  
Renewable Energy 
Corporation  REC 09.05.2006 
Eidesvik Offshore EIOF 27.06.2005  Revus Energy REVUS 27.06.2005 
Eitzen Chemical ECHEM 02.11.2006  SeaBird Exploration Ltd SBX 11.04.2006 
Faktor Eiendom FAKTOR 08.12.2006  Sevan Marine SEVAN 13.12.2004 
Findexa Limited FIND 25.05.2004  Trolltech TROLL 05.07.2006 
Funcom FUNCOM 13.12.2005  Via Travel Group VIA 09.06.2005 
 
Table A1 presents the sample selection. The companies are organized in their alphabetical order.  
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Appendix 2: Construction of variables 
 
Table A2: Definitions of the explained and the independent variables 
Name of variable Definition 
InitRet P1/P0 -1  
Constant Constant 
NIt News hits in t weeks/months after (before) the listing 
PositiveNews Equal to NISub  if the offering price is set above the midpoint of the indicative price 
range. If otherwise equal to zero 
NegativeNews Equal to NISub if the offering price is set below the midpoint of the indicative price. If 
otherwise equal to zero.  
MShare Underwriter’s share of the total proceedings in the sample 
Oversub Number of offered shares divided by subscription demand 
PrRev Percentage price revision from the midpoint of the initial price range 
Book Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the offering is carried out using a bookbuilding method.  
Venture Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the company has venture capital backing. 
Hot Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the observation lies within a period defined as a hot 
period. 
lnAge The natural logarithm of the company age. 
lnProc The natural logarithm of the IPO gross proceedings 
B2C Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the company is a Business-to-Consumer oriented firm. 
Otherwise equal to zero 
 
Table A3: Definitions of media exposure variables 
 Variable Observation period begins Observation period ends 
NI-1 week One week prior to the listing One day prior to the listing 
NISub First day of subscription period Last day of the subscription period  
NI+1month Date of the listing One month minus one day after the listing 
NI+2 months One month after the listing Two months minus one day after the listing 
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Table A4: Underwriter market share 
Underwriter Market share 
Carnegie 25.76 % 
ABG Sundal Collier 17.97 % 
UBS 14.79 % 
Enskilda 11.71 % 
Pareto 8.18 % 
DnB 6.37 % 
Goldman Sachs 1.41 % 
CIBC World Markets 1.41 % 
Alfred Berg 0.37 % 
Fernley Fonds 0.25 % 
First Securities 0.25 % 
Handelsbanken 0.15 % 
 
As seen from table A4, six investment banks dominate the Norwegian IPO industry, capturing nearly 85 % of 
the market. It should though be mentioned that a few IPOs give a high contribution to some of the market 
shares. E.g. Renewable Energy Corporation and Bergesen Worldwide Gas, raising respectively NOK 6.9 and 
4.2 billion through their IPOs, accounting for 46 % of the total proceedings in the sample.   
 
Table A5: Hot/cold markets 
Time period Hot/cold market issue Average initial return 
2003 Q1 N/A N/A 
2003 Q2 N/A N/A 
2003 Q3 N/A N/A 
2003 Q4 Cold market issue -2.26 % 
2004 Q1 Cold market issue -0.50 % 
2004 Q2 Cold market issue 0.94 % 
2004 Q3 N/A N/A 
2004 Q4 Hot market issue 3.66 % 
2005 Q1 Hot market issue 10.09 % 
2005 Q2 Hot market issue 2.78 % 
2005 Q3 Cold market issue -3.51 % 
2005 Q4 Cold market issue 2.37 % 
2006 Q1 Hot market issue 10.94 % 
2006 Q2 Hot market issue 23.08 % 
2006 Q3 Hot market issue 3.22 % 
2006 Q4 Cold market issue 0.70 % 
 
Table A5 shows the average initial return across annual quarters. A hot market is defined as a quarter when the 
average initial return exceeds the median initial return for all quarters (0.02370). As seen, there is a relatively 
small variance across the periods, except the first quarter of 2005, and furthermore the first and the second 
quarter of 2006, where one may observe relatively high initial returns. 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Diagram A1: Sample distribution 
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Diagram 1 displays the distribution of offerings across intervals of underpricing. 
 
Table A6: Underpricing across sectors 
 
 N Mean initial return 
Median initial 
return 
Mean Offer 
size (NOK) 
Consumer Discretionary 6 1.27% -0,00.43% 370,358,333 
Consumer Staples 3 -1.68% -1.43% 117,000,000 
Energy 16 6.17% 2.83% 453,638,262 
Financials 5 2.21% 1.89% 244,539,998 
Health Care 4 2.97% 2.23% 54,897,245 
Industrials 6 2.17% 1.66% 452,948,273 
Information Technology 11 4.58% 0.00% 822,375,000 
Materials 2 -2.16% -2.16% 392,112,500 
 
Table A6 presents the average and median initial return, and furthermore the mean offer size, across sectors.  
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Table A7: Average media exposure across sectors 
 NI-2 months NI- 1 month NI+1 month NI+2 months 
Energy 2.44 4.06 6.25 3.31 
Financials 2.00 5.80 2.60 0.80 
Industrials 1.50 7.33 7.00 2.67 
Consumer Staples 5.67 11.00 13.00 5.00 
Health Care 3.25 3.75 2.75 1.00 
Information Technology 2.64 6.55 8.55 4.18 
Consumer Discretionary 3.33 7.17 6.83 3.33 
Materials 3.50 3.50 4.50 2.50 
 
Table A7 presents the average media coverage for each observation period across sectors.  
 
Diagram A2: ‘NISub’ across intervals of underpricing 
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Diagram A2 illustrates that the initial return is negatively correlated with media coverage in the subscription 
period. 
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Diagram A3: ‘NI+1month’ across intervals of underpricing 
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Diagram A3 illustrates that highly underpriced offerings stand out in terms of media hits in the month 
subsequent to the offering. As seen, offerings that are underpriced above 20 % receive more than twice as 
much media attention on average. However, please, notice that only three offerings belong to this category.  
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Appendix 4: Regression results 
Table A8: Multivariate analysis on underpricing and ‘NI-1 week’ 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
‘Constant’ -0.01179 -0.02756 -0.0133 -0.00015** 
 (-0.4) (-0.97) (-0.83) (2.26) 
‘NI-1week’ -0.00032 0.001223 0.000597 0.03484 
 (-0.06) (0.22) (0.12) (-0.02) 
‘MShare’ -0.1319 -0.1038   
 (-0.96) (-0.75)   
‘OverSub’ 0.007087 *** 0.008328 *** 0.008667 ***   
 (-3.08) (3.78) (4.34)  
‘lnAge’ 0.006746 0.005139   
 (-0.83) (0.62)   
‘Venture’ 0.00675 -0.00061   
 (-0.32) (-0.03)   
‘PrRev’ 0.1695    
 (-1.61)    
‘Book’ -0.06556 ** -0.07236 ** -0.07052 ***  
 (-2.43) (2.67) (2.67)  
‘Hot’ -0.00008 0.00907   
 (0.00) (0.39)   
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Table A8 presents the regressions results of a multivariate analysis on the relationship between ‘InitRet’, and NI-
1 week (media coverage in the week prior to going public). ‘Regression 1’ includes all of the control variables 
described in chapter 3.3.1. In ‘Regression 2’ ‘PrRev’ is excluded due to a suspicion of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, in ‘Regression 3’ all insignificant variables from ‘Regression 2’, except ‘NI-1 week’, are removed. In 
the final regression ‘NI-1 week’ is run as the only independent variable.. The results show that ‘NI-1 week’ is 
statistically insignificant in all the regressions. Furthermore, one should notice that the coefficient values of this 
variable are sensitive to changing model specifications.   
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Table A9: Multivariate analysis on ’NISub’ and underpricing I 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression  3 Regression  4 
Constant 0.00116 -0.00693 0.00911 0.05429 *** 
 (0.04) (-0.24) (0.59) (3.5) 
NISub -0.00611 -0.00718 * -0.00839 ** -0.00762 * 
 (-1.6) (-1.91) (4.92) (-1.87) 
MShare -0.089 -0.0625   
 (-0.65) (-0.46)   
OverSub 0.007977 *** 0.00909 *** 0.009358 ***  
 (3.46) (4.23) (-2.44)  
lnAge 0.005784 0.004786   
 (0.75) (0.62)   
Venture 0.00866 0.0042   
 (0.42) (0.21)   
PrRev 0.1328    
 (1.28)    
Book -0.05668 ** -0.05904 ** -0.05563 ***  
 (2.16) (2.24) (2.2)  
Hot -0.00556 0.00017   
 (-0.24) (0.01)   
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Table A9 displays the regression results of the multivariate analysis on the relationship between underpricing 
and NISub (media coverage in the subscription period. ‘Regression 1’ includes all the control variables described 
in chapter 3.3.1. Furthermore, in ‘Regression 2’ ‘PrRev’ is excluded due to a suspicion of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, in ‘Regression 3’ all insignificant variables from ‘Regression 2’ are removed. Finally, in ‘Regression 
4’ ‘NI-1 week’ is run as the only independent variable.  
As seen, ‘NISub’ is statistically significant when removing ‘PrRev’. This may indicate on multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, ‘NISub’ display stable coefficient values when run in regressions including different combinations of 
independent variables (please, note that all combinations are not presentetd). Regarding the control variables, 
‘Book’ and ‘OverSub’ display statistical significance. 
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Table A10: Multivariate analysis on ‘NISub’ and underpricing II 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Constant 2.437 2.564 2.85 
 (0.48) (0.51)   (0.55) 
InitRet -5.759   
 (-1.04)   
MShare 6.496 6.48 5.574 
 (1.30) (1.31)   (1.11) 
lnProc -0.0984 0.0875 -0.1147 
 (-0.35) (-0.31)   (-0.41) 
Venture 0.3878 0.3675 0.302 
 (0.49) (0.48)   (0.39) 
NI-2 months 0.2545* 0.2491* 0.3101** 
 (1.96) (1.91)   (2.41) 
Overpriced 0.6286   
 (0.63)   
Overpricing  -10.86 -23.82 
  (-0.61)   -1.45 
Underpricing  -7.252  
  (-1.35)    
R2 (adj) 9.5 % 10.7 % 7.9 % 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
Table A10 examines the hypothesis suggesting that overpricing determines media coverage in the subscription 
period (proposed in chapter 6.1.2). All regressions are run on ‘NISub’ as the explained variable.  
In ‘Regression 1’ the hypothesis is tested by including a dummy (‘Overpriced’), which is equal to one if the 
offering receives a negative first day return, and if otherwise equal to zero. As seen from the regression, this 
dummy is insignificant. In ‘Regression 2’ the ‘Overpriced’ dummy is replaced with variables capturing overpricing 
and underpricing. These are equal to ‘InitRet’ if the offering is overpriced or underpriced respectively, if 
otherwise equal to zero. As seen none of these variables display significant coefficients. Furthermore, 
‘Overpricing’ displays a relatively low coefficient value, indicating economical insignificance. For every 
percentage overpricing, media coverage increases by only 0.1 articles. In ‘Regression 3’ ‘Underpricing’ is 
removed. As seen, the coefficient value of ‘Overpricing’ is increased, but still insignificant. Furthermore, the 
coefficient value is still somewhat low, indicating one article increase per five percentage underpricing. This must 
be regarded as rather low.  
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Table A11: Multivariate analysis on underpricing and ’NegativeNews’/’PositiveNews’ 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 6 Regression 7 
Constant -0.0079 0.0108 0.0180    -0.00201 0.00005 0.0515*** 
 (-0.26) (0.36) (0.65) (-0.07) (0.00) (3.99) 
NegativeNews -0.0066 -0.0097** -0.0093**    -0.0084* -0.0118** 
 (-1.41) (-2.14) (-2.09)  (-1.9) (-2.55) 
PositiveNews -0.0029 -0.0056  -0.0041   
 (-0.53) (-1.03)  (-0.74)   
MShare -0.1111 -0.11 -0.1844    -0.0881   
 (-0.74) (-0.71) (1.29) (-0.55)   
OverSub 0.0083*** 0.0082*** 0.0074***   0.008775*** 0.0068***  
 (3.54) (3.40) (3.27) (3.50) (3.05)  
lnAge 0.0056 0.0053 0.0048   0.002319 0.0037  
 (0.68) (0.64) (0.60) (0.28) (0.46)  
Venture 0.0021 0.0035 0.0006    -0.00105 0.0068  
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.03) (-0.05) (0.32)  
Book -0.0567*      
 (1.99)      
Hot 0.0054 0.0060 0.0192    0.02004 0.0161  
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.89) (0.87) (0.74)  
R2 (adj) 29.30 % 24.50 % 24.6% 18.4 % 23.6 % 9.6 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Regressions in table A11 are run on ‘InitRet’ as the explained variable. ‘Regression 1’ includes all of the control 
variables that are introduced in chapter 3.3.2, except for ‘PrRev’. In addition, ‘NegativeNews’ and ‘PositiveNews’ 
are included to test for the hypotheses suggesting an asymmetrical relationship between underpricing and 
media coverage in the subscription period. Furthermore, in ‘Regression 2’ ‘Book’ is excluded due to a suspicion 
of multicollinearity. As seen, after this removal ‘NegativeNews’ turns out to be statistical significant. In 
‘Regression 3’, ‘NegativeNews’ is replaced with ‘PositiveNews’. However, ‘PositiveNews’ does not display any 
statistical significance. Furthermore, the removal of ‘MShare’ does not change the statistical significance of 
‘NegativeNews’. Finally, ‘NegativeNews’ is statistically significant even in a univariate regression.  
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Table A12: Multivariate analysis on ‘NI+1 month’ and underpricing 
 Regression 1  Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Constant -12.437 -11.326 -12.55 2.863* 6.1187** 
 (-1.29) (-1.23) (-1.37) 
 
(2.10) (7.07) 
InitRet             15.383* 16.346* 16.724* 15.863* 13.477 
 (1.72) (1.95) (1.99) 
 
(1.87) (1.41) 
MShare           11.211 11.135  14.369 *  
 (1.12) (1.19)  (1.56)  
lnProc    0.8222 0.7807 0.9129*   
 (1.57) (1.56) (1.86) 
 
  
Venture           0.60     
 (0.39)     
B2C  5.86*** 5.734*** 5.646*** 5.958***  
 (3.48) (3.58) (3.51) 
 
(3.68)  
Hot               0.598     
 (0.38)     
R2 (adj) 20.50 % 24.80 % 24.20 % 22.60 % 1.90 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Regressions in table A12 are run on ‘NI+1 month’ as the explained variable. In ‘Regression 1’ all of the control 
variables that are described in chapter 3.3.2 and ‘InitRet’ are included. The results display that ‘InitRet’ is 
statistically related to ‘NI+1 month’, even when running regressions including control variables in different 
combinations (please, notice that all combinations are not presented). Furthermore, the coefficient values of 
’NI+1month’ are stable in all regressions. One may also notice that ‘B2C’ display a statistical relationship on a high 
significance level. Furthermore, ‘lnProc’ is statistically significant when removing ‘MShare’, ‘Venture’ and ‘Hot’ 
(Regression 3). ‘MShare’ is statistically significant when being replace with ‘lnProc’. This may indicate on 
multicollinearity.  
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Table A13: Multivariate analysis on ’NI+2 months’ and underpricing 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Constant 0.95 1.818 2.3817 
 (0.15) (1.71) (2.75) 
InitRet -2.744 -2.759 -1.488 
 (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.28) 
MShare 5.219 5.413 5.551 
 (0.82) (0.88) (0.94) 
lnProc 0.0474   
 (0.14)   
Venture 0.5283 0.5203  
 (0.55) (0.54)  
B2C 0.602 0.615 0.483 
 (0.56) (0.58) (0.47) 
Hot 0.711 0.7041  
 (0.71) (0.71)  
R2 (adj.) 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Regressions in table A13 are run on NI+2 months. As one can see, none of the regressions, including different 
combinations of independent variables, display any explanatory power. Furthermore, none of the independent 
variables display any significance. Examining the coefficients of ‘InitRet’, one may see that the values are 
remarkably low. According to the results, one percentage underpricing decreases media coverage by 0.027 
articles. This must be regarded as economically insignificant, as well as implausible.  
 
 
Table A14: Multivariate analysis excluding outliers I 
 Regression 1 Regression 2
Constant -0.03483 -0.02425 
 (-1.60) (-1.12) 
NIt -0.00168 -0.0049* 
 (-0.40) (-1.74) 
MShare -0.1347* -0.1007* 
 (-1.32) (-1.00) 
OverSub 0.007168*** 0.007695*** 
 (4.38) (4.77) 
Venture 0.01156 0.01223 
 (0.69) (0.77) 
lnAge 0.009999* 0.009055* 
 (1.62) (1.54) 
Hot 0.02943* 0.02299* 
 (1.68) (1.32) 
Book -0.03247 -0.02625 
 (-1.51) (-1.26) 
R2 (adj) 38.50 % 42.5 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
. 
 56 
Table A14 presents a multivariate analysis, using a sample excluding possible outliers. Regressions are run on 
‘InitRet’ as the explained variable ‘Regression 1’ includes ‘NI-1 week’ as an independent variable. In ’Regression 2’ 
this variable is replaced with ‘NISub’. From the results one may see that ‘NISub’ is still statistically related to 
‘InitRet’ on a 10 % significance level. However, the coefficient value is somewhat reduced, compared to the 
results presented in table A9. Furthermore, ‘Hot’, ‘lnAge’ and ‘MShare’ display statistical significance to ‘InitRet’ 
in this regression. ‘NI-1 week’ is still statistically insignificant. 
  
 
Table A15: Multivariate analysis excluding outliers II 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2
Constant -6.63 2.164 
 (-0.64) (0.32) 
InitRet 24.35 -0.758 
 (1.94) (-0.09) 
MShare 11.807 5.312 
 (1.18) (0.81) 
lnProc 0.5626 -0.0115 
 (1.03) (-0.03) 
Venture 0.268 0.433 
 (0.17) (0.42) 
B2C 5.683 0.552 
 (3.38) (0.50) 
Hot -0.279 0.532 
 (-0.17) (0.49) 
R2 (adj) 20.50 % 0.00 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses display the t-statistics. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % levels respectively. 
 
Table A15 presents the results of a multivariate analysis on the relationship between ex post media coverage 
and underpricing, using a sample excluding possible outliers. ‘Regression 1’ is run on ’NI+1 month’ as the 
explained variable, while ‘Regression 2’ is run on ‘NI+2 months’. The results display that ‘InitRet’ is still statistically 
significantly related to ‘NI+1 month’. As seen, however, the coefficient value is remarkably higher compared to the 
results presented in table A12. Furthermore, one should notice that ‘InitRet’ is statistically insignificant in 
‘Regression 2’.      
 
Appendix 5: Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
Table A17: Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
   InitRet PrRev MShare lnProc OverSub Hot Book lnAge Venture B2C       NI-1 week NISub NI+1 month       NI+2 months NegativeNews 
PrRev 0.426               
MShare 0.033 0.241              
lnProc -0.037 -0.042 0.217             
OverSub 0.489 0.414 0.265 0.172            
Hot 0.269 0.408 0.181 -0.041 0.315           
Book -0.283 -0.06 0.049 0.253 0.059 -0.025          
lnAge 0.088 -0.094 0.093 0.098 0.178 0.026 -0.026         
Venture 0.069 -0.149 -0.186 -0.104 0.075 0.106 -0.027 0.108        
B2C                        -0.09 -0.152 -0.03 0.085 0.202 -0.205 0.043 0.078 0.016       
NI- 1 week -0.003 0.034 0.049 0.043 0.074 -0.048 -0.173 0.247 0.186 0.23      
NISub -0.253 -0.205 0.163 0.103 0.155 -0.181 -0.239 0.02 0.057 0.258 0.359     
NI+1 month                     0.194 0.243 0.184 0.253 0.473 0.043 0.183 0.086 0.027 0.425 0.363 0.385    
NI+2 months                      -0.041 -0.14 0.13 0.045 0.232 0.105 -0.146 0.001 0.064 0.066 0.155 0.242 0.49   
NegativeNews -0.337 -0.565 -0.227 0.050 -0.218 -0.176 0.25 0.060 0.071 0.213 0.168 0.609 0.001 0.065  
PositiveNews 0.045 0.331 0.433 0.162 0.384 -0.024 -0.194 -0.064 -0.043 0.061 0.278 0.572 0.464 0.126 -0.257 
 
Table A17 displays Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The values range from -1 to 1, indicating the degree of the linear relationship between two variables. The value of -1 
indicates a perfect negative linear correlation, while the value of 1 indicates a perfect positive linear relationship.  
Correlation between two independent variables may cause multicollinearity, implying type 1 errors or wrong estimates (Brooks, 2002). As seen, none of the variables are 
strongly correlated. However, there is some correlation between some of the independent variables. Particular interest should be given to ‘PrRev’, which seems to be relatively 
correlated with ‘OverSub’ and ‘Hot’. However, one should be aware that this test does not tell anything about the direction of the relationships, nor take any biases into account. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients should therefore be interpreted with caution. Further testing is therefore needed in order to investigate the possibility of multicollinearity. In this 
thesis I have conducted this by running regressions including suspicious independent variables in different combinations.   
Shaded cells indicate coefficients that deserve attention regarding multicollinearity. 
Appendix 6: Hausman test 
Step I 
 
 
 
 
  
Step II 
Constant 0.144305*** 0.029123 4.955027
NISub -0.054466*** 0.007782 -6.998703
MShare -0.063752 0.098838 -0.645015
OverSub 0.007708*** 0.001586 4.861271
Hot -0.012669 0.015841 -0.799789
Venture -0.001451 0.014811 -0.097943
Book -0.028016 0.019579 -1.430922
lnAge 0.004548 0.005498 0.827260
Residual 0.052009 *** 0.008120 6.404956
R2 (adj.) 64.3 %
 
Appendix 6 displays the results from a Hausman test, which is carried out in order to test for endogeneity 
between underpricing and media coverage in the subscription period. 
Proceeding: In step I a regression on NISub is run to obtained its fitted values. The residuals are stored, and 
used as an independent variable in Step II. In Step II a regression on ‘InitRet’ is run, including the fitted values 
for NISub as a regressor (adjusted by the residuals from Step I). As seen, the residual variable is significant on a 
1 % level. Endogeineity is therefore not rejected. 
The procedure is in accordance with the user’s manual of the EViews software package.  
 
Variable Coef. Std. Error t-statistics
Constant 2.982264 4.920712 0.606063
B2C 1.200889 0.845339 1.420600
lnProc -0.103018 0.275668 -0.373702
InitRet -7.714559* 4.363224 -1.768087
NI-2 months 0.256231** 0.125069 2.048724
R2 (adj.) 12.24 %
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